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What determines the success or failure of economic reforms?  Confronted with adverse
external conditions and self-inflicted imbalances, many developing countries have embarked in
ambitious reform programs.  Depending on the countries, the programs have aimed at removing
trade barriers, revamping the tax system, restructuring govermnent spending, spurring financial
liberalization, privatizing state-owned enterprises, or some combination of these.  Over the last
two decades, reform programs have more often than not been supported by adjustment credits
and  loans from the World Bank.  In fact, support by the World Bank  (and the  International
Monetary Fund) is interpreted by the international community as a signal that the country is
committed to reform.  But not all these programs have worked.  Earlier assessments compared
the change in the economic performance of countries with and without programs supported by
the World Bank or  the International Monetary Fund, and concluded  that these  programs did
increase  economic growth (Goldstein and  Montiel,  1986, Khan,  1990, and  Corbo and Rojas,
1992).  However, a study using a similar methodology found no impact on the economic growth
of  the poorest  countries  (Elbadawi,  1992).  And based on  a  case-by-case  evaluation  of  182
adjustment programs, the World Bank's  own Operations Evaluation Department concluded that
36 percent of them had not met their objectives (Dollar and Svensson, 1998).  Given these mixed
results, the conditions under which the programs were adopted are receiving increasing attention.
This paper evaluates whether the "rigidity" of the labor market matters for the success of
economic reforms.  If labor costs cannot vary  freely in response to changes in labor demand,
economic reforms  could lead to  a  decline in  output, at least for  some time.  Consider trade
liberalization for instance.  With a flexible labor market, real wages  in the import-competing
1sectors of the economy should decline, pushing labor costs down across the economy and thus
making the export sectors more competitive.  But if wages cannot be cut, the import-competing
sectors could be forced to shed more labor than is warranted whereas the export sectors would
remain uncompetitive.  Overall, the reallocation process would take much longer than with a
flexible labor market, and it could be associated with high unemployment or under-employment.
Note that this argument is economic in nature.  Although  it has been made in more elaborate
ways before (see Edwards, 1988, and Rama, 1997, among others), the basic idea stems from the
second-best  principle:  economic  reformns  require  labor  reallocation,  so  that  they  could  be
counter-productive in countries where this reallocation cannot take place.
Labor market conditions may also affect the adoption and success of economic reforms
through other, unrelated mechanisms.  Most economic reforms create winners and losers.  A vast
political economy literature has emphasized resistance  by potential  losers as one of the main
obstacles to adjustment (Alesina and Drazen, 1991, and Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991, are two of
the best-known examples).  Without stretching the argument too far, resistance by losers could
also lead to a half-hearted adoption of reforms, thus diluting their economic impact.  Workers in
protected industries, in the public sector, or in banks are amongst the most obvious losers, at
least in the short run.  In countries where these workers are a large and well-organized group,
resistance to reform could be fierce.  In fact, the mere threat of prolonged strikes or massive
street demonstrations could make a  government delay the  adoption  of economic reforms,  or
water down their substance.  Clearly, this argument is political in nature.
The economic and the political argument have different  implications  for the design of
reforms.  Based  on  the economic argument,  labor market  deregulation  should  be one  of the
components  of  the  reform package.  Policy measures  such  as  the  suppression  or  freeze  of
2minimum wages, and the abolition of mandatory benefits, would have to be considered.  This
conclusion has been reached by many in the international community.  A report prepared by the
World Bank for Latin  America and the Caribbean concluded that "labor  market reform is the
area of structural reform where the least progress has been made in the region" (Burki and Perry,
1997, p.  57).  This  report  proposed  to  "remove  the  distortions,  many  of  them  induced by
government regulations, that make labor costly and risky in relation to its relative abundance in
the economy" (p. 38, emphasis added).  In a similar vein, the Inter-American Development Bank
(1997) concluded: "labor code reforms have been few and not very deep", adding that "current
labor legislation may have hindered the reabsorption of workers who were displaced during the
reform process" (p. 79, emphases added).
The political argument leads, arguably, to an almost opposite conclusion.  In the political
economy literature, the more equal the distribution of adjustment costs the shorter and weaker
the resistance  to  economic reforms.  From  this  perspective,  the appropriate  complement  to
adjustment programs would  not  be  labor market  deregulation,  but  rather the  introduction of
mechanisms that compensate the workers affected by the reforms, at least partially.  Examples
include job separation packages, early retirement programs and unemployment benefits.  These
mechanisms have actually been used in many adjustment programs  entailing substantial public
sector downsizing, often with the financial support of the World Bank.  Some of the separation
packages offered to redundant workers in state-owned enterprises to be privatized would easily
qualify as "golden  handshakes"  (Kikeri,  1997).  Over a  sample  of 41  downsizing programs
financially supported by the World Bank, Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) estimated the average
spending per job separation at $2,400.  The figure was as high as $13,000 in the civil service of
3Senegal, $16,000 in the mining sector of Bolivia, and $17,000 in the public enterprises of India,
although all three countries had a per capita income of less than $1,000 per year.
The fact  that the  economic and  the political  argument  have different  implications  is
somewhat blurred by the emphasis, by the proponents of the former, on enhanced safety nets.
The aim of these safety nets is to prevent households from falling into poverty as a result of the
reforms.  Examples  include  public  works  programs  and  means-tested  income  transfers.
However, the workers who are affected by liberalization and downsizing are better seen as part
of the urban middle class.  Adjustment might dramatically reduce  their  living standards, but
relatively few of them become poor, even several years after losing their jobs  (see Rama, 1999).
As a result, these workers may not be eligible for, or not interested in, most of the safety net
initiatives.  By combining  labor market  deregulation and  enhanced  safety nets, the economic
argument would then lead to an income transfer from the urban middle  class to the poor.  By
recommending compensation, on the other hand, the political argument would aim at mitigating
(or even offsetting) the income loss of the urban middle class.
The results in this paper show that labor market "rigidity" is indeed a key determinant of
the success or failure of economic reforms.  They also show that the political mechanism is more
plausible than the economic mechanism.  The empirical analysis compares the annual growth
rates of 119 countries, over period 1970-1986. These countries differ considerably in their labor
market policies  and  institutions.  Starting  in  1980, many among them  undertook  substantial
economic reforms with the support of the World Bank.  The analysis thus combines information
on economic growth, on labor market policies, and on adjustment  lending.  The labor market
information is from a database of labor market policies and institutions across countries which is
currently under construction  at the World Bank (Rama and  Artecona,  2000).  This  database
4allows computing a  variety of rigidity  indicators whose definition will be  discussed in detail
below.  The results show that countries with more rigid labor markets experienced declines in
growth rates before they adopted adjustment programs, and weaker recoveries afterwards.
This pattern is summarized in figure 1, which compares the estimated growth rates of two
adjusting  countries, corresponding to  the  25th and the  75th percentiles  of  an  aggregate labor
market  rigidity  indicator.  These  countries are  identified  hereafter  as  "flexible"  and  "rigid"
respectively.  The  growth  rates  reported  in  the  figure  are  annual  averages,  based  on  an
econometric analysis that will be presented in the next section of the paper.  The figure includes
four periods  or phases, corresponding to the  IO'h to  4"' year before the launching  of the first
serious  adjustment effort  (DI,  or  "long  before"),  the three  years  up  to  the  adoption  of the
program (D2, or "right  before"),  the three  years immediately following the program  (D3, or
"right  after"), and the 4th to  10t' years after the beginning of economic reforms (D4, or "long
after").  The figure  shows that  long  before  adjustment the  growth  rate  is  similar  in  both
countries.  But it subsequently declines more sharply,  and recovers less rapidly,  in the rigid
country.  Adjustment can be deemed successful in both countries, to the extent that the growth
rate increases right after it.  However, long after adjustment the flexible country grows faster
than it did long before it, whereas the opposite is true for the rigid country.
The paper then replicates the econometric  analysis using  four pairs of  more narrowly
defined indicators of labor market rigidity.  These pairs measure the level of minimum wages,
the cost of mandated benefits, the strength of the labor movement, and the size of government
employment respectively.  Given that a vast majority of government employees are unionized in
developing countries, the last two pairs of indicators arguably capture the ability of potential
losers from reform to convey their grievances.  The first two pairs, on the other hand, reflect the
5extent to which the government directly interferes with the adjustment of labor costs.  The results
reported in  figure  1 hold  for the last two pairs  of indicators,  but not  for  the first two.  Put
differently, countries where organized labor is potentially influential experience recessions right
before adjustment, and slower recoveries afterwards, but growth performance is not affected by
the level of minimum wages and non-wage costs.  These results provide support to the political
argument, while questioning the validity of the economic argument.
2.  The Empirical  Strategy
Adjustment programs are comprehensive policy packages, usually affecting several areas
of the economy at once.  Changes in taxation, government spending,  trade barriers, financial
regulations and enterprise ownership are among their most frequent components, but they are not
the only ones.  Given the multiplicity of measures, it is not possible to spell out all the channels
through which the programs could affect economic performance.  Hence the need of a reduced-
form approach to evaluation.  Moreover, adjustment programs were launched at different points
in time in different countries.  This continuity of the reform process makes it difficult to identify
a common program period, as earlier studies did (see, for instance, Corbo and Rojas, 1992, and
Elbadawi,  1992).  Hence the need for an empirical strategy explicitly accounting for economic
reforms being adopted in different years depending on the countries.
The strategy chosen in this paper aims at evaluating the impact of labor market rigidity on
growth rates over the decade preceding the adoption of a serious reform effort and the decade
immediately after.  These two  decades are decomposed  in four  periods,  as  described  in the
Introduction.  This  strategy thus  leads to the definition of four dummy variables, labeled DI
6(long before),  D2 (right before), D3 (right after) and D4 (long after). For all industrial  countries
and some (non-adjusting) developing countries, the dummies verify Dl  = D2 = D3 = D4 = 0 in
all years. But for most developing  countries,  some  of the dummy variables  take positive  values
in specific years.  More specifically, in each of the 10th to 4th years before the first serious
adjustment  effort,  Dl  = 1, whereas  the other  dummies  are set equal to zero. Subsequently,  in the
3rd year  before adjustment  D2 becomes  equal to one while DI switches  back to zero. The same
logic applies  to D3 in the 1st year following  the launching  of economic  reforms  and to D4 in the
4h year. Even in an adjusting  country,  all four dummies  are equal to zero in all the years  more
than one decade  before or after the beginning  of the adjustment  process.
The comparison  between growth rates in these four periods is carried out for countries
with different  degrees of labor market rigidity.  Let L be a rigidity indicator.  Because labor
market  policies  and institutions  evolve  gradually,  and have seldom been the target  of adjustment
programs,  the rigidity indicator L can be assumed  to be relatively stable over time within each
country. Under  this hypothesis,  the empirical  approach  adopted in this paper can be summarized
by the following  equation:
Yit = 00  + 01 Dlit  + 0 2 D2it + 0 3 D3it + 0 4 D4it +
+1D  itLi  +  2 D2it Li +  3 D3itLi + X4 D4it Li + x5 Li
+ RI Yit-I + R2 Wt +  3  Xit  + Ui+ Sit  (1)
where  the subscript  'i'  is used for countries  and the subscript  "t" for years. Equation  (1) links the
growth rate of output in a specific  year (yit)  to its level in the previous year (yit.1),  the phase of
7the country's  adjustment process  (Dlit  to  D4it), its  labor rigidity  indicator  (Li), the external
conditions (Wt) and other variables (X 1t).  Depending on the specification, the latter include year
dummies, interaction terms between the external conditions  and the phase  of the adjustment
process, and other controls.  The assumptions made regarding the country-specific tenn  ui and
the stochastic disturbance  Ei,  determine the appropriate way to estimate the coefficients in this
equation, as will be discussed below.
The coefficients in equation (1) can be used to assess the impact of labor market rigidity
on economic growth under a variety of circumstances.  Consider two countries that differ in their
labor market rigidity indicator by AL, but are otherwise identical.  In a "normal"  year, distant
from an adjustment effort by more than one decade, the difference in growth rates between these
two countries, Ay, verifies:
Ay = X5 AL  (2)
Over the adjustment phase DK (with K = 1, 2, 3 or 4) this difference becomes:
Ay = XK +X5 )AL  withK  = 1,  4(3)
If all the  XK  coefficients were equal to zero, economic performance around the reform period
would not depend on the degree of labor market rigidity.  But the latter could still affect long-run
performance if coefficient X 5 were different from zero.  The empirical strategy of this paper thus
focuses on the sign and significance of coefficients X 1 to X5.
8Figure I can be interpreted as a graphical representation of this strategy.  The two lines in
the figure report the predicted levels of the growth rate yi, based on equation (1).  These levels
are calculated under the assumption that the values of all exogenous variables, except the labor
market indicator L, are the same in the two countries.  In drawing the figure, the values of the
exogenous  variables  are replaced by  their  sample means.  The upper  line  corresponds to  a
country with a relatively small L, whereas the lower line is for a country with a relatively large
L.  The vertical distance between the two lines, in turn, represents the predicted value of Ayi,
based on equation (3).  This distance varies across the four phases of the adjustment process.  For
given values of coefficients k? to  5,  the difference increases with the assumed difference in the
level of indicator L between the two countries.
Because it focuses on the determinants of growth rates before and after a policy change,
equation (1) differs from "standard" growth regressions.  The latter try to account for long-run
performance, and therefore deal with average growth rates over  several decades.  Within this
literature there is a trend towards using higher frequency data, such as five-year averages (see,
for instance, Islam, 1995).  This trend has been criticized, as it may confuse growth effects and
business-cycle  effects  (Pritchett,  1998).  However,  relying  on  high-frequency  data  is  not
uncommon when assessing the effects of adjustment policies.  For example, annual growth rates
have been used to evaluate the effects of stabilization programs (Easterly, 1996; Calvo and Vegh,
1999;  Echenique and  Forteza, 2000) and  monetary  policies (Karras,  1999), whereas  average
growth rates  over  two  and  three  years  were  used  to  assess  the  consequences  of  programs
supported by the International Monetary Fund (Khan,  1990) and the World Bank  (Corbo and
Rojas, 1992; Easterly et. al., 1997).
93.  Defining  Rigidity  and Reforms
The empirical  strategy  just outlined  crucially  depends on the availability  of at least one
indicator  of labor market rigidity. Ten of them are used in what follows. Two are intended  to
capture the aggregate rigidity level, whereas the other eight focus on specific distortions.  In
dealing with  aggregate rigidity, it  is  important to  keep in  mind the limited enforcement
capabilities  of many  developing  countries. Their labor codes  may include an impressive  array  of
clauses aimed at protecting workers, but their labor inspection  agencies are often too weak or
corrupt  to force  employers  to comply. This distinction  suggests  that the regulations  that are most
distortive on paper may well be the least enforced in  practice (see Squire and Suthiwart-
Narueput,  1997).
The number of ILO conventions  ratified by a country is a reasonable proxy for the
"thickness" of its labor code, hence for the degree of labor rigidity as stated on paper.  This
number  will be identified as LO in what follows. The conventions issued by the International
Labour Organisation  reflect the ideal regulatory  framework  from an 'institutionalist'  perspective
(see Freeman,  1993). These conventions  cover  a variety of labor market issues, from child labor
to placement  agencies. Their ratification  by a country  gives them legal status, thus superseding
domestic  regulations  on those issues. Because  the institutionalist  perspective  sees employees  as
weaker  than employers,  ILO conventions  usually  restrict  the ability of the latter to decide  on the
tenns and conditions  of work. Not surprisingly,  these conventions  are seen as a source of labor
market distortion  from a neoclassical  perspective.
In practice, however,  the degree of labor market rigidity depends on how labor market
regulations  are implemented  and enforced. From this point of view, it is the outcome of the
10regulations  that  matters,  rather  than their  number.  Different  observers  emphasize  different
outcomes though.  High minimum wages are a favorite candidate, as they mimic the standard
textbook distortion of market equilibrium.  Mandated benefits, such as old-age pension, health
insurance or maternity leave, feature high  in the list too.  If workers do not  "pay"  for these
benefits through lower wages, their burden falls on employers.  Mandated job  security and high
firing costs are yet another typical  example of a  labor market  distortion.  Finally, the labor
market can also be distorted when trade unions are large and powerful,  or when governments
employ a substantial share of the labor force.  Note that distortions  of this  latter sort do not
necessarily stem from a "thick" labor code, which re-emphasizes the distinction between rigidity
on paper and in practice.
The available data can be used to construct indicators of labor market rigidity dealing
with  minimum  wages,  mandated  benefits,  trade  unions  and  government  employment.
Unfortunately, there  are  not  enough  data  to  construct  an  indicator  of job  separation  costs
covering a large number of countries.  This particular dimension of labor market rigidity is thus
ignored in the empirical analysis, although it is potentially important.  For instance, using data
from 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Heckman and Pages (2000) have argued
that job separation costs have a substantial impact on the level of employment.  A similar claim
had been made by Fallon and Lucas (1991), using data from India and Zimbabwe.  In principle,
job separation costs could affect the effectiveness of economic reforms in the sample of countries
considered in this  paper.  If they did, the conclusion that  labor rigidity  matters for political
reasons, more than for economic reasons, would need to be qualified.
The  variables  measuring  minimum  wages,  mandated  benefits,  trade  unions  and
government employment will be identified in what follows as MW, BF, TU and GT respectively.
11Given that labor issues tend to be sensitive and controversial, two indicators are used for each of
these four dimensions of labor market rigidity.  The preferred indicator carries the number one
(for example, MWI).  The aim of the second indicator (MW2 in the example) is to verify the
robustness of the empirical results.  All eight indicators, as well as LO, are normalized, so that the
country with the highest level gets a one, the country with the lowest level gets a zero, and the
rest  falls in  between.  Moving  from  zero to  one  can  thus  be  interpreted  as  moving  from
maximum flexibility to maximum rigidity.
The four dimensions of labor market rigidity considered so far can be  combined into a
single indicator, identified as LI in what follows.  This indicator, which captures aggregate labor
market rigidity in practice, is defined as:
MWl.  + BFI. +TU1. + GTI.
Ll-=  1  1  1  1  (4) 1  4
The aggregate labor rigidity indicator is also calculated for countries where information on one
of the four indicators in the numerator  is missing, in which case the denominator is adjusted
accordingly.  All the indicators in the numerator being normalized, LI  varies between zero and
one, like each of its individual components.  But unless all dimensions of labor market rigidity
are perfectly correlated, the variance of L 1 is smaller than the variance of its components.
The potential correlation between the four dimensions of  labor market  rigidity implies
that  the  corresponding  indicators  cannot  be  used  in  the  empirical  analysis  without  taking
additional precautions.  For the sake of the argument, suppose that minimum wages do not affect
economic performance whereas mandated benefits do.  Suppose also that minimum wages tend
12to be  higher in countries with  more generous mandated benefits.  Under these  assumptions,
replacing L by MW1 in equation (1) could lead to statistically significant values for coefficients
X, to k5, thus suggesting that minimum wages matter.  A possible solution to this problem would
be to include the other three indicators among the Xit variables.  But this solution could lead to a
different problem.  Because of the potential correlation between the different dimensions of labor
market rigidity, the precision of the estimates would fall.  Now, replacing L by BF1 in equation
(1) and using the other three indicators as controls could lead to statistically insignificant values
for coefficients k, to k5, thus suggesting that mandated benefits do not matter.
To  avoid the omitted-variable bias  and mitigate the multicolinearity problem, a set of
complementary indicators is defined.  For instance, if L is replaced by MW1 in equation (1), the
complementary indicator (called LI-MW 1) is given by:
BF1. +TU1. + GTI.
(LI- MW). =  1  1  (5)
1  ~~~3
This indicator is then included among the Xit variables in equation (1), jointly  with its interaction
with the four phases of the adjustment process (dummy variables DI to D4).  When information
on  one of  the dimensions of  labor rigidity is  missing,  the  numerator of  the  complementary
indicator is adjusted accordingly.
The definition of the labor market rigidity indicators used in this paper is partly inspired
by criteria used in other cross-country studies aimed at evaluating the impact of specific policies
or institutions on economic performance.  The distinction between rigidity on paper (indicator
LO) and in practice (LI) is reminiscent of the distinction between legal and effective central bank
13independence,  explored by Cukierman  (1995).  The composite rigidity indicator (LI), which
encompasses  a variety of labor market distortions,  bears some resemblance  with the openness
indicator  constructed  by Sachs and Warner (1995),  which combined four possible distortions  to
international  trade flows.  The attempt to disentangle the role of the individual labor market
distortions  (MW,  BF, TU and GT) is similar  to the attempt, by Rodrik and Rodriguez  (1999),  to
identify  the role of each of the four possible  distortions  to trade combined by Sachs and Warner.
Finally, the introduction  of a complementary  indicator for each of the individual labor market
distortions (L1-MW to LI-GT) is directly borrowed from a previous study on labor market
rigidity  and economic  performance  by Rama (1995).
The empirical strategy adopted by this paper also requires the identification  of serious
reform  efforts. The four phases of the adjustment  process (DI to D4) are defined relative to the
beginning  of those efforts, making it necessary  to ascertain if and when they begin.  Because
reforms  deal with a wide range of economic  policies,  from trade barriers  to government  spending
to financial  regulation,  it would  be difficult  to rely on policy outcomes. As several authors  have
pointed out, a variety of indicators can be considered for each of these outcomes.  Their
simultaneous inclusion in  a  cross-country regression would  lead to  multicolinearity and
dramatically  reduce the number  of degrees  of freedom (see Levine and Renelt, 1992,  and Sala-i-
Martin, 1999). An alternative  would  be to combine  these indicators  in some policy  score, but the
credibility  of any specific  combination  would  be questionable.
Measuring reform efforts through policy outcomes could also  obscure one  of  the
mechanisms  through which labor market rigidity potentially  operates. Resistance  to economic
reforms  may lead to the half-hearted  adoption  of key policy measures. For instance, a country
that has in principle agreed  with the international  community  to liberalize  its foreign  trade may
14end up erecting new barriers under pressure from vocal constituencies.  These barriers, in turn,
may adversely affect economic performance.  If reform efforts  were measured through policy
outcomes, such as the average tariff or the ratio of foreign trade to output, the country would
have  to  be  considered  as  a  non-reformer.  Poor  performance  would  then  be  seen  as  the
consequence of lack of reform, and labor market rigidity would seem irrelevant.  On the other
hand,  if reform efforts  were  measured through the agreement  reached  with  the international
community, the country would have to be considered as a failed reformer.  In this case, poor
performance could be linked to labor market rigidity.
This paper adopts a direct approach to the measurement of reform efforts, based on the
accumulated borrowing from the World Bank for structural and sectoral adjustment programs.
Adjustment  lending  by  the  World  Bank  carries  stringent  policy-related  conditions  that  the
borrowing countries have to meet for the disbursements to be authorized.  Loans including more
than one hundred conditions each are not uncommon.  While waivers on specific conditions are
often granted, massive adjustment lending is usually associated with the launching of sweeping
economic reforms.  The diversity of the conditions associated with adjustment lending makes it
difficult to  use them  as the  basis  for an  indicator of economic  reform.  Instead, this  paper
assumes that  a  country  begins  its  reform process  in  earnest  when  accumulated  adjustment
borrowing exceeds a critical threshold.
4.  The  Data
The implementation of the empirical strategy outlined  in the previous  section requires
information on  macroeconomic aggregates, on labor market  policies  and  institutions, and  on
15reform  efforts.  Information  on macroeconomic  aggregates is  readily  available.  The  World
Development Indicators  database  of  the  World Bank  (2000)  reports  annual  data  on  output,
measured in real terms, for a large number of countries.  These data  are used in this paper to
account for the dependent variable yit. Moreover, based on these data it is possible to calculate
the annual growth rate of industrial countries, taken altogether.  Because this  growth rate is a
good  indicator of the  external conditions  facing  individual countries,  it  can be  used  as  the
independent variable Wt.  Data on yit and Wt are for period  1970-1996, so as to cover one full
decade before the beginning of structural adjustment programs.
Measuring the extent of labor market rigidity, or the seriousness of reform efforts, is not
as  simple.  Indicators  of  labor  market  rigidity  are  constructed  based  on  the  cross-country
database compiled by Rama and Artecona (2000).  In addition to the number of ILO conventions
ratified by the country, the following indicators are used: the ratio of minimum wages to average
labor costs in large manufacturing  firms (MW1), the ratio of minimum wages to  income per
capita (MW2), the percentage of salaries that employers and employees have to contribute to the
social security administration (BF  1), the legal number of days of maternity leave with full pay
for  a  first  child born  without  complications  (BF2), the  membership  of  the  labor movement
measured  in  percentage  of  the  labor  force  (TU1),  the  ratification  by  the  country  of  ILO
convention 87 on the right to bargain collectively (TU2), employment in the general government,
including local administrations, as a fraction of the labor force (GTI)  and employment in the
central government as a fraction of the labor force (GT2).
All  these  indicators  are  calculated  as  averages  over  period  1970-1999.  Because
comparable data on labor markets in developing countries are scattered, some of these averages
actually result from a small number of observations, mainly in the 1980s and early 1990s.  For
16some developing countries, information on specific indicators is missing altogether.  The paucity
of the data implies that time-variant indicators  of labor market rigidity  cannot be  used in the
empirical analysis.  Data on indicators MWI, BF1, TUI and GT1 are combined to construct the
aggregate  labor  rigidity  indicator  LI,  as  defined  by  equation  (4).  Because  labor  market
indicators are not available for all countries, this is the information set that determines the size of
the sample that can be used in the analysis.  The Appendix reports the estimated value of LI for
each of the countries in the sample, and ranks them based on this indicator.
The coverage of the sample can be evaluated based on table 1.  The regions in this table
are defined according to the geographic boundaries used by the World Bank in its operational
work.  Almost  sixty percent of the  countries and territories in  the world are included in  the
sample.  Although there are regional disparities, only in East Asia and the Pacific islands does
the fraction  of countries included in the sample  drop considerably.  Moreover,  the countries
included in the sample tend to be large.  Overall, the sample accounts for more than 90 percent of
the world's population and output.  The shares are similar across all regions, with the exception
of Sub-Saharan Africa.  But even there, the  countries in the  sample represent more than 70
percent of the region's  population, and more than 80 percent of the region's  output.  Almost
three-quarters of the countries in the sample embarked in  substantial  economic reforms  with
support from the World Bank.  Except for industrial countries, which do not borrow from the
World Bank, all regions had a considerable share of reformers.
The regional averages of the ten rigidity indicators considered in the empirical analysis
are shown in table 2.  By construction, the aggregate rigidity indicator varies between zero and
one.  The other labor market indicators are also normalized in the regression analysis below.  In
table  2 they are presented  without any transformation,  so as to  simplify their interpretation.
17Based on the aggregate labor rigidity indicator, the countries in East Asia and the Pacific Islands
are the most flexible, whereas those in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are the most rigid.  But
the regional  ranking varies across indicators.  For instance,  social  security contributions  are
lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas minimum wages are highest in South Asia.
The  extent  of  labor  market  rigidity  varies  considerably  across  countries.  However,
program and non-program countries are quite similar, as differences in means do not reach one
standard deviation for any of the ten indicators considered.  Program countries exhibit slightly
higher averages than non-program countries for minimum wages, social security contributions,
maternity leave  and  the  ratification of  ILO convention  87.  Non-program  countries  exhibit
slightly higher averages for union membership and government employment.  The labor rigidity
indicator is larger in program than non-program countries, but the difference is only a quarter of
a standard deviation.  These figures suggest that the adoption of economic reforms is not directly
related to the nature  of the labor market policies and institutions  in place.  The timing of the
reforms could be affected, however, as will be discussed below.
The number of ILO conventions ratified and the aggregate rigidity indicator can be used
to identify the most flexible, the median and the most rigid country in each region.  This is done
in table 3.  The results suggest that in spite of the relative arbitrariness underlying the definition
of  labor market  rigidity,  the  resulting country classification  is  consistent  with  conventional
wisdom. Thus, regardless of the indicator used, the USA appear as the most flexible of industrial
countries, and Uruguay as the most rigid of Latin American countries.  At the worldwide level,
the most flexible countries are in East Asia (Korea or Hong Kong, depending on the indicator),
whereas the most rigid are in Western Europe (Italy or Sweden).
18The difference between rigidity on paper and rigidity in practice is also highlighted by
table 3.  For example, based on the number of ILO conventions ratified, Uganda and Chile are
the median countries in their regions.  However, when actual rigidity is considered instead, they
both turn out to be most flexible.  The case of India is even more extreme, as its position in the
South Asian region switches from most rigid on paper to most flexible in practice.  Conversely,
Korea is the most flexible country in East Asia based on the number of ILO conventions it has
ratified, but it is the median country based on its aggregate labor rigidity indicator.
For reform efforts,  this  paper relies on  a database  of  disbursements  for  World Bank
adjustment credits and loans over period 1980-1996 (World Bank, 1997).  The reform process is
assumed  to  begin when  the  country-specific  ratio  of  accumulated  adjustment  borrowing to
predicted (or trend) output exceeds the 25th percentile of the distribution of this ratio across all
borrowing countries and all years from  1980 to  1996.  Predicted output is used instead of the
actual output to avoid a situation where countries facing a recession would suddenly qualify as
reformers, even if they did not borrow any additional resources to support adjustment program.
The Appendix identifies with the label "No  program" the  countries in  the sample that never
exceeded the critical threshold.  For the countries that did, the Appendix  indicates the year in
which the threshold was reached for the first time.  This  year is used  to assign values to the
dummy variables DI to D4.
The timing of major reforms depicted by the indicator constructed in this paper is quite
consistent  with  information  from  other  sources.  For  instance,  in  their  study  on  global
integration, Sachs and Wamer (1995) report the year of opening to trade for a large number of
countries.  This information can be used to compute the number of years each country has been
open over period 1980-1996.  For developing and transition economies, the correlation between
19the number of years open according to  Sachs and  Warner and the  number of years  since the
beginning of reforms according to this paper is 0.32.  In a similar  spirit, the Inter-American
Development  Bank (1997, page 45) reports  the initial  year of financial  liberalization  in  two
dozen countries in the region.  The correlation between the number of years liberalized and the
number of years since the beginning of reforms is 0.29.
5.  Main  Results
Equation  (1)  was  estimated  replacing  L  by  each  of  the  ten  labor  market  rigidity
indicators, and using three different econometric techniques: fixed effects, random effects and
the generalized method of the moments (GMM).  The use of these three techniques is justified
because none of them  is clearly preferable in the  context of this paper.  The random effects
technique is more efficient than the fixed effects technique, but the estimated coefficients are
biased when the country-specific effects are correlated with the explanatory variables.  The fixed
effects  technique  proceeds by  differentiation, so that  it effectively  removes country-specific
effects and the bias they may cause.  But in the process it also removes the (time-invariant) labor
rigidity  indicator,  implying  that  coefficient  ks cannot  be  estimated.  Moreover,  in  dynamic
models this differentiation introduces a different type of inconsistency, known as Nickell's  bias.
This other inconsistency could be substantial in data sets covering a limited number of years.
Whether it is relevant in a data set like the one. used in this paper, which includes annual data
over more than a quarter of a century, is unclear.  The GMM estimates presented in this paper
use suitably lagged values of the endogenous variable, in orthogonal deviations and in levels, as
instruments  (Arellano  and  Bover,  1995, Arellano  and  Bond,  1998).  The validity  of  those
20instruments  can  be  assessed  using  a  Sargan  test.  If  the  instruments  are  valid,  the  GMM
technique yields consistent estimates of all the parameters in the model, including 45. However,
the asymptotic properties of the GMM technique may not be verified over a sample containing
scarcely more than one hundred countries (Blundell and Bond, 1998).  Also, the total number of
observations that can be used with the GMM technique drops substantially.  This is because the
data set is an unbalanced panel, and only consecutive observations for each country could be
included  (Arellano  and  Bond,  1998).  To  sum  up,  the  three  econometric  techniques  have
strengths and weaknesses.  Consequently, rather than choosing  one over the others, the paper
presents results obtained with all three.  The credibility of these results should be higher if they
are similar regardless of the technique used.
The main results are reported in tables 4 to 9.  In order to interpret them, it is convenient
to focus on the central panel of the tables.  The independent variables included in this panel are
the four phases of the adjustment process, DI  to D4, their interaction with the selected labor
rigidity indicator, and the labor rigidity indicator itself.  In terms of equation (1), the coefficients
multiplying these variables are PI  to P4,  XI to X 4 , and X, respectively.  These coefficients are not
dramnatically  different  when the model is estimated in  levels (with the random effects or the
GMM technique) or in differences (with the fixed effects technique).  This  relative similarity
suggests that the unobservable country-specific disturbances us do not play an important role.
More  formally,  it  is  not  possible  to  reject  the  hypothesis  that  country-specific  effects  are
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, except in the regressions using the second rigidity
indicator in tables  8 and  9.  This  hypothesis was assessed  using the Wald test proposed by
Arellano (1993).  The results reported for the regressions with the second rigidity indicator in
21tables 8 and 9 use only  orthogonal deviations as instruments,  implying that the coefficient X5
could not be estimated
One of the main implications of the results in tables 4 to 9 is that economic reforms are
effective when labor markets are flexible.  GDP growth rates increase after adjustment, as shown
by the positive and generally significant values of coefficients P3 and N in almost all the tables.
These coefficients measure the increase  in the GDP  growth rate that  a fully flexible country
would experience in the aftermath of economic reforms.  Only in Table 4, where  labor market
rigidity  is  measured  through  the  number  of  ILO  conventions  ratified,  does  the  size  and
significance of coefficients 133  and  P4 decline.  But this  decline might be due to  the fact that
actual labor market rigidity  is not appropriately accounted for in these regressions.  When the
number of ILO conventions ratified is replaced by indicators of actual labor market rigidity, the
values of coefficients P3 and 14 become remarkably consistent.  Their averages across Tables 5
to 9 are 0.042 and 0.024 respectively.  Over a ten-year period, therefore, economic reforms can
make an impressive contribution to economic growth.
Labor market  rigidity,  on the  other hand,  is associated  with  dramatic  drops in  GDP
growth rates in the years preceding adjustment, and weak recoveries or continued recessions in
subsequent years.  This  adverse effect is revealed by the negative  and statistically significant
values of coefficients  X2 and  X 3 in table  5.  Consider the two  countries  (rigid and  flexible)
depicted in figure 1.  The values of L in these two countries, corresponding to the 75th and 25'h
percentiles of the worldwide  distribution of the aggregate rigidity indicator, are 0.41 and 0.22
respectively.  Based  on the  results  in  table  5, the GDP  growth  rate  would  be  almost three
percentage points  lower  in  the rigid  country than  in  the flexible  country, both  right  before
adjustment and right after it.
22Not all labor market rigidity indicators have the same effect, however.  Differences
across  tables are revealing  in this respect. The comparison  between  the central  panels of tables 4
and 5 shows  that the success of economic  reforms  depends  on how rigid a country  is in practice,
but is not affected  by its rigidity on paper.  When rigidity is measured by the number of ILO
conventions  ratified,  the coefficients  Xi to  4 estimated  with all three techniques  are statistically
insignificant. This is additional evidence that the number of ILO conventions  ratified is not a
good indicator  of labor market rigidity.  The analysis is replicated in Tables 6 to 9 for all the
different dimensions  of actual labor market rigidity. The number of columns in these tables is
higher, as they include  two rigidity indicators  each. Because  of this multiplicity  of columns,  the
interpretation  of the results  is somewhat  more difficult. However,  some distinct  pattems  emerge.
The strongest effects are associated with trade union membership and govemment
employment. Coefficients  X 2 and k3 are negative in all the columns in tables 8 and 9, and
significantly  so in roughly  half of them. These coefficients  are especially  large when the rigidity
indicators  considered  are the share  of the labor force that is unionized  (TU  I) or employed  in the
general government  (GT1). They are always significant  in the latter case.  For the share of the
labor force employed  in the general govemment,  a negative  impact  on GDP growth  rates can be
found even long after adjustment,  as revealed by the large and statistically  significant  value of
coefficient 4.  The pattern is not as clear when the rigidity indicators considered are the
ratification  of ILO convention  87 (TU2)  and the share  of the labor force employed  by the central
government  (GT2),  but this is not surprising. While trade union membership is an indicator  of
rigidity in practice,  the ratification  of an ILO convention  is an indicator  of rigidity on paper. As
regards government  employment,  a relatively slim central administration is not incompatible
with over-staffing  at the provincial  or the state level.
23At the other end, minimum  wages and mandated  benefits do not appear to reduce GDP
growth  rates  in any of the four phases  of the reform  process.  In tables 6 and 7, coefficients  Xi  to
X 4 are  either insignificant or  (in a  few cases) significantly positive, but  they are  never
significantly  negative. Taken literally, the results in table 6 would imply that relatively high
minimum  wages  are associated  with a better  economic  performance  before adjustment. The size
of coefficients  X 1 and X 2 is quite consistent  across-all  the estimations  in this table, and coefficient
X 2 is statistically  significant  in half of the cases. But no significant  effect is observed  on growth
rates after adjustment.
Finally,  the results in tables 4 to 9 suggest  that labor market rigidity may have an adverse
effect on growth  rates in non-adjustment  years. This effect is captured  by coefficient  X5,  which
is large (in absolute terms) and significant  when L is measured by either the number of ILO
conventions  ratified or by the aggregate  rigidity indicator,  in tables 4 and 5.  This coefficient  is
also negative in a few of the regressions  using specific rigidity indicators, in tables 6 to 9.
However, these negative effects on growth performance  in non-adjustment  years vanish when
industrial countries, or countries with high administrative  capacity, are  excluded from the
sample,  as will be discussed  in the next section.
6.  Robustness
Some  of the assumptions  underlying  the regression  results reported in tables 4 to 9 could
be challenged.  First, some of the explanatory variables considered could be  defined, or
measured,  differently. The timing of economic  reforms is a case in point.  Second, important
24explanatory  variables could be missing.  If labor market rigidity, or economic  reforms, were
correlated  with those missing variables,  the reported regression  results could be biased. Third,
all the regressions  assume that the effects of the explanatory  variables  are the same everywhere.
In practice, labor market rigidity and economic  reforms could have different impacts in some
countries,  or subsets  of countries. And fourth, the regression  analyses reported in tables 4 to 9
assume  that all the explanatory  variables  are predetermined. While this is a plausible  assumption
in most cases,  it is questionable  regarding  the timing of economic  reforms.
The main results reported in the previous section are considered robust if the size and
significance  of coefficients  PI  to (4, XI  to X4, and X5  do not change  substantially  when these four
challenges  are considered. Changes  in the coefficients  multiplying  other control variables are
deemed  irrelevant  from the perspective  of this paper. For the first three challenges,  it is actually
possible  to re-estimate  the regressions  in tables 4 to 9 under different  assumptions. While those
assumptions are explained in more detail below, the corresponding  regression  results are not
discussed,  or even reported,  unless they contradict  the findings in the previous  section. For the
fourth challenge, namely the endogeneity  of economic reforms, it is not possible to produce
alternative  estimates. The discussion  thus focuses  on the possible effects of endogeneity  on the
estimated  value of the coefficients  of interest.
The first challenge concerns the  measurement of  the explanatory variables in  the
regressions. As the analysis described  in the previous sections had already considered  a large
number of labor market indicators,  the robustness analysis focused on the other explanatory
variables. Thus, the GDP growth rate of industrial  countries was replaced  by a set of annual
dummy  variables. More importantly,  the definition  of the phases of adjustment,  captured  by the
dummy  variables  Dl to D4, was modified. These phases had been determined  in relation  to the
25beginning of  a  serious reform effort, as  identified by  a  critical threshold of the  ratio of
accumulated  adjustment  borrowing  to predicted  output. To assess  the robustness  of the results, a
different borrowing indicator and two other critical thresholds were considered.  The new
borrowing  indicator  was the accumulated  credit from the World Bank for all purposes,  and not
just  for adjustment.  The two other thresholds were zero and the  median of the ratio of
accumulated  borrowing to predicted  output. Using zero as a threshold means that reforms are
assumed  to begin in earnest  when the country  receives  its first adjustment  loan or credit  from the
World Bank.  The median threshold is more demanding and leads to  the classification  of
countries  that borrowed  small amounts  as non-reformers.
Another change in the definition of the dummy variables DI  to  D4 was related to
transition economies.  Countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were under
central planning before the adoption of economic reforms, which usually took place as they
became members of  the  World Bank.  Although their labor market indicators before the
beginning  of the transition  were formally  comparable  to those of market economies,  their actual
labor market policies and institutions were quite different.  Pooling market and non-market
economies in the years preceding the reforms could therefore be misleading.  To assess the
potential  bias resulting  from this pooling,  the dummies  Dl and D2 were not set equal to one if
the country  was not a member  of the World  Bank  at that time.
The second challenge concerns omitted variables.  Labor market rigidity could be
correlated  (positively  or negatively)  with the quality of government  policies in other areas that
matter for economic  growth. If this was so, the effects  attributed  to labor rigidity in the previous
section  could actually  be due to those  other  policies. The importance  of good  policies  for growth
performance has been highlighted by recent research on  the  effectiveness of  foreign aid.
26Burnside and Dollar (2000) constructed a policy index combining indicators of trade, monetary
and  fiscal policy.  They found that foreign aid had had a positive  impact on growth only in
countries where  this  index revealed  good policies.  The index  constructed  by  Burnside and
Dollar was therefore included in all the regressions in tables 4 and  9, both  as a self-standing
explanatory variable and interacted with the DI to D4 dummy variables.
The validity of the third challenge, namely that effects could vary systematically across
subsets of countries, can be assessed by splitting the sample, or removing groups of observations.
The exclusion of outliers from the sample caused no significant changes in the results.  Also, all
the regressions in tables 4 to 9 were re-run excluding industrial countries.  This change can be
justified  on the grounds that industrial countries do not  borrow for adjustment for the World
Bank.  As mentioned before, the exclusion of industrial countries made the long-run impact of
labor rigidity indicators on growth vanish. On the other hand, the negative impact of unionization
and  government employment  on  GDP  growth  rates  right  before  and  right after  adjustment
became stronger.
Countries differ in their administrative capacity too.  The same labor market regulations
could have different effects in different countries depending on the extent  to  which they are
enforced.  Compliance is in  principle much higher in  industrial countries  than in developing
countries.  But there  is  also  a  substantial  heterogeneity  among  the  latter.  To  address this
concern, all countries in the sample were ranked according to three of the components of the
political risk index compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (see Knack and Keefer,
1995).  These  components  refer  to  lack  of  corruption,  law  and  order,  and  the  quality  of
bureaucracy.  The rankings were based on the average value of each of these components from
1984 to 1997. Countries were split in two sub-samples of equal size based on the simple average
27of the three rankings.  Again, the main difference with the results in tables 4 to 9 was the
weakening  of the effect  of labor market  rigidity on growth  in non-adjustment  years.
The fourth and final challenge concerns self-selection.  An important concern when
estimating equation  (1) is the possible endogeneity  of economic  reforms. Variables that affect
economic  growth  rates might also condition  the decision to implement  a reform program. One
potential source of endogeneity  is the correlation between the (time-invariant)  country-specific
disturbances  ui and the dummy variables Dl  to D4.  This is not likely to be an issue in the
context of this paper, however. As discussed before, the hypothesis  that the country-specific
disturbances  are uncorrelated  with the explanatory  variables  cannot be rejected,  except in a few
regressions. Even if they were correlated,  the fixed effects estimates  and the GMM estimates
obtained using orthogonal  deviations  would be unbiased, as they both get rid of the country-
specific  disturbances.
A potentially more problematic source of endogeneity is the correlation between the
time-variant  disturbances  ejt  and the dummy  variables  Dl to D4. When equation  (1) is estimated
imposing the condition that all the X coefficients  be equal to zero, the coefficient  f2,  which
captures growth right before economic reforms, becomes significantly  negative.  This is an
indication of self-selection  bias, in the spirit of Heckman's (1989) "pre-program  test".  If the
adoption  of reform  programs  was independent  from the macroeconomic  context,  there should  be
nothing special about growth performance in the previous years.  In fact, coefficient P2  iS
statistically  insignificant  when the pre-program  test is run on flexible  countries  only, suggesting
the absence  of self-selection  in their case.
The possible  endogeneity  of economic  reforms  in rigid countries  is key to interpret  one of
the main results in tables 4 to 9. In the previous  section,  the negative and statistically  significant
28value of coefficient X 2 was interpreted as evidence that rigid countries experience deeper
recessions  before adjustment, but no explanation  was offered for this result.  The correlation
between  the time-variant  disturbances  cit  and the dummy  variable D2 makes it more meaningful.
The negative  value of coefficient  X2 is an indication  that countries with rigid labor markets are
reluctant to adopt economic reforms, unless they are forced to do so by the severity of the
recessions  they face.
The endogeneity of economic reforms in rigid countries should not affect other key
results in tables 4 and 9.  In particular, it should not affect the value or the interpretation  of
coefficient  X 3. The latter would  be biased only if the disturbances  &it  were correlated  over time.
Serial correlation  of this sort implies  that the adverse  shocks  preceding economic  reform  in rigid
countries  may persist. In this case, the negative  value of coefficient  X 3 in rigid countries  would
just be reflecting  the continuation  of adverse  shocks,  rather than the ineffectiveness  of economic
reforms. However,  the hypothesis  that the residuals of equation (1) are not serially correlated
could not be rejected using the tests for first- and second-order  serial correlation in the GMM
estimation. This is not surprising  to the extent  that the two main sources  of persistence  in growth
rates are controlled  for in the regressions. These  two sources are the worldwide  business  cycle,
captured  through  the growth rate of industrial  countries, and the dynamics of the output growth
rate, captured  through the lagged value of the dependent  variable.  In any event, lack of serial
correlation  implies that the estimated coefficients  X 3 and X 4 are not biased, and do reflect the
impact  of labor market  rigidity on the effectiveness  of reforms.
297.  Conclusion
This paper has shown that labor market policies and institutions do matter for the success
of economic reforms, but they probably do  so for political  reasons,  more than for economic
reasons.  In particular, high  minimum wages  or  mandated benefits  do not  appear to  hinder
economic growth, neither before nor after adjustment. This result is consistent with the evidence
available for industrial countries, where  labor market policies  arguably have modest, hard-to-
uncover effects on economic efficiency (see Freeman, 2000).  Even the controversial result that
relatively  high  minimum  wages  are  associated  with  a  somewhat  better  performance  before
adjustment,  and  not  necessarily  with  a  worse  performance  afterwards,  is  to  some  extent
consistent with recent findings for the USA (see Card and Krueger,  1998).
The possible irrelevance of minimum wages and mandated  benefits  for the success of
economic reforms questions the wisdom of efforts to deregulate the labor market.  Admittedly,
specific labor market regulations  which are potentially very  distortive,  such as mandated job
security, have not been considered in this paper.  Efficiency gains from removing or bypassing
those regulations could be sizeable.  But abolishing minimum wages or curtailing social security
benefits might not contribute much to economic performance, if at all.  Moreover, labor market
deregulation might be effective at reducing rigidity on paper, but not necessarily in practice.  For
instance, based on the analysis above, repealing ILO conventions would be a futile endeavor.
Given that the usual ingredients of adjustment programs appear to be highly effective at raising
output growth rates, it seems preferable to concentrate reform efforts on issues such as taxation,
government spending, trade barriers, financial regulations and enterprise ownership, rather than
on re-drafting the labor code.
30On the other hand, unionization and government employment are associated with deeper
recessions before adjustment, and weaker recoveries (or continued recessions) afterwards.  One
interpretation of this finding is that organized interest groups that stand to lose from the reforms
may  succeed  in  delaying  their  adoption  and  diluting  their  content.  This  is  the  natural
interpretation from the perspective  of the new political  economy, which  views  distributional
conflict as one of the main forces shaping economic policy.  The contribution of this paper is to
provide  some  empirical  evidence in  support of  this  perspective.  In  the  process,  the paper
identifies organized labor as a key opponent of economic reforms.  Many policy makers around
the world would consider this finding quite obvious.  But its policy implications deserve some
attention.
Recent analyses of the effectiveness of development assistance have focused on the need
to identify the conditions for its success.  The probability of failure has been shown to be higher
in countries with poorly  defined property rights and high  levels of corruption  (Burnside and
Dollar, 2000).  It also has been shown to be higher in countries where governments have not
been democratically elected or have been in power for a long time, as well as in countries that
are ethnically fragmented (Dollar and Svensson,  1999).  The recommendation  emerging from
these  analyses  is  that  development  agencies  should  do  a  better job  at  selecting promising
candidates for adjustment support.  Unfortunately, some of the countries that most desperately
need this kind of support may not qualify.
The findings in this paper imply that the focus should not just be on picking winners, but
also on defusing the opposition of (vocal) losers. Based on the econometric results, reforms have
been successful in countries where trade union membership and  government employment are
small.  Arguably, this  conclusion should be valid  in spite of country differences in  property
31rights, corruption, democracy or ethnicity, as the  econometric analysis takes unobservable
country heterogeneity  into account  through of the use of panel data.  The failure of reforms in
countries where trade union membership  and government  employment  are large suggests that
insufficient  attention has been paid to the impact of economic reforms on urban, middle-class
groups.  This choice is justifiable on economic  grounds, as these groups are not poor.  But it
might have been self-defeating  on political  grounds.
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35Table I
The  Sample  and  the  World
East  Eastern  Middle
Sub-  Asia/  Europe/  Latin  East/
Saharan  Pacific  Central  America/  North  South
All  Africa  Islands  Asia  Industrial  Caribbean  Africa  Asia
The world
Number of countries  200  47  31  27  28  39  20  8
Program countries  103  36  10  25  0  21  6  5
The sample
Number of countries  119  23  12  17  23  21  18  5
Annual growth rate (%)  3.5  3.4  6.5  0.2  3.0  3.3  4.4  4.4
Program countries  76  20  8  17  0  20  6  5
Annual growth rate(%)  3.3  3.0  5.9  0.2  ...  3.4  4.9  4.4
Sample/ World
% of countries  59.5  48.9  38.7  63.0  82.1  53.8  90.0  62.5
% of 1995 GDP  99.1  82.4  98.0  93.3  99.9  96.2  98.3  99.9
% of 1995 population  93.4  71.1  95.4  81.5  99.9  94.7  98.9  99.9
Source: Authors' calculations using data from IMF and World Bank.  Growth rates are averages over period 1970-1986.Table 2
Labor Market Policies and Institutions across Regions
East  Eastern  Middle
Sub-  Asia/  Europe/  Latin  East/
Saharan  Pacific  Central  America/  North  South
Labor market rigidity indicators  All  Africa  Islands  Asia  Industrial  Caribbean  Africa  Asia
Minimum wage/Industrial  wage (%)  29.7  18.0  26.8  32.1  32.6  30.2  28.4  44.1
Minimum  wage/GDP per capita(%)  73.4  164.1  50.7  33.1  46.7  59.8  88.9  171.0
Social security contributions  (%)  19.8  12.7  14.3  34.2  22.2  18.9  18.9  20.0
Maternity leave with full pay (days)  85.7  73.9  74.4  175.5  103.4  71.2  60.1  69.0
Union membership/Labor  force (%)  23.8  9.9  14.7  67.3  37.3  18.3  16.6  9.1
Ratification  of ILO convention 87 (0 or 1)  0.469  0.444  0.131  0.500  0.687  0.612  30.6  0.304
General government/Labor  force(%)  10.8  5.2  6.5  14.6  15.6  10.2  12.5  5.3
Central government/Labor  force (%)  4.9  3.2  3.3  3.6  5.7  6.0  7.9  3.0
ILO conventions ratified (number)  33.8  25.5  10.7  41.5  55.9  38.5  24.0  20.7
Aggregate rigidity indicator  (0 to 1)  0.316  0.226  0.177  0.477  0.393  0.317  0.318  0.273
Source: Authors' calculations  using data from Rama and Artecona (2000). Labor  market indicators are averages over period 1970-1999.Table 3
Labor  Market  Rigidity  within  Regions
East  Eastern  Middle
Sub-  Asia/  Europe/  Latin  East/
Saharan  Pacific  Central  America/  North  South
Classification  based on  All  Africa  Islands  Asia  Industrial  Caribbean  Africa  Asia
ILO conventions ratified
Minimum  Korea  Botswana  Korea  Croatia  USA  El Salvador  Oman  Nepal
Median  Pakistan  Uganda  Thailand  Romania  Portugal  Chile  Cyprus  Sri Lanka
Maximum  Italy  Guinea  Singapore  Bulgaria  Italy  Uruguay  Iraq  India
Aggregate rigidity indicator
Minimum  Hong Kong  Uganda  Hong Kong  Turkey  USA  Chile  Jordan  India
Median  Colombia  Ghana  Korea  Poland  Finland  Guatemala  Kuwait  Sri Lanka
Maximum  Sweden  Burkina Faso  Philippines  Belarus  Sweden  Uruguay  Algeria  Bangladesh
Source: Authors'  calculations using data from Rama and Artecona (2000).  See the appendix  for details.Table 4
ILO Conventions  Ratified,  Adjustment  and Growth
Dependent  variable:  annual growth rate of GDP (1970-86)
Independent  variables  Fixed effects  Random effects  GMM
Years long before  the program (DI)  0.000  -0.008  -0.010.
(0.000)  (-0.810)  (-1.22)
Years right before the program (D2)  -0.011  -0.020  -0.02
(-0.686)  (-1.319)  (-1.159)
Years right after the program (D3)  0.018  0.014  0.011
(1.318)  (1.061)  (0.750)
Years long after the program (D4)  0.020*  0.015  0.011
(1.708)  (1.307)  (1.001)
DI x ILO conventions  ratified  0.007  0.007  0.015
(0.374)  (0.405)  (0.991)
D2 x ILO conventions  ratified  -0.025  -0.024  -0.018
(-0.960)  (-1.047)  (-0.643)
D3 x ILO conventions  ratified  -0.013  -0.012  -0.007
(-0.519)  (-0.539)  (-0.308)
D4 x ILO conventions  ratified  -0.007  -0.004  0.002
(-0.329)  (-0.225)  (0.142)
ILO conventions  ratified  -0.023***  -0.027***
(-3.353)  (-3.927)
Industrial GDP growth  0.738***  0.672***  0.661***
(9.778)  (9.179)  (5.064)
GDP growth rate in previous year  0.220***  0.262***  0.218***
(13.273)  (16.261)  (4.264)
Industrial  GDP growth x DI to D4  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.196  0.161
Sargan test (p value)  1.000
Wald, uncorrelated  effects (p value)  0.837
ISt  order serial correlation  (x 2)  -4.723***
2nd order serial correlation  (x2)  -2.396***
Number of observations  3408  3408  2516
Number of countries  112  112  106
Note:  Figures in parentheses are "t" statistics.  Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and I percent
significance levels are indicated by one, two and three asterisks respectively. One-step
version of the GMM estimates are reported, due to small sample considerations  (Blundell
and Bond, 1998).  The GMM estimates  use the third to sixth lags of the endogenous  variable
as instruments.Table 5
Aggregate  Rigidity  Indicator, Adjustment  and Growth
Dependent  variable: annual growth rate of GDP (I1970-96)
Independent  variables  Fixed effects  Random effects  GMM
Years long before the program (DI)  -0.017  -0.019*  -0.022
(-1.541)  (-1.872)  (-1.778)
Years right before the programn  (D2)  0.006  0.007  0.003
(0.417)  (0.503)  (0.161)
Years right after the programn  (D3)  0.047***  0.045***  0.045***
(3.142)  (3.098)  (2.500)
Years long after the program (D4)  0.025**  0.020*  0.018
(2.164)  (1.849)  (1.331)
Dl x Aggregate  rigidity indicator  0.042  0.038  0.048**
(1.436)  (1.473)  (1.734)
D2 x Aggregate rigidity indicator  -0.094**  -0.103***  -0.090
(-2.492)  (-2.947)  (-1.713)
D3 x Aggregate  rigidity indicator  -0.097***  -0.095***  -0.092*
(-2.607)  (-2.770)  (-1.840)
D4 x Aggregate  rigidity indicator  -0.042  -0.032  -0.029
(-1.474)  (-1.253)  (-0.808)
Aggregate rigidity indicator  -0.055***  -0.053***
(-4.349)  (-3.370)
Industrial  GDP growth  0.709***  0.675***  0.693***
(10.964)  (10.674)  (7.243)
GDP growth  rate in previous year  0.150***  0.194***  0.195***
(8.412)  (10.890)  (4.664)
Industrial  GDP growth x DI to D4  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R2  0.222  0.171
Sargan test (p value)  1.000
Wald, uncorrelated  effects (p value)  0.382
15'  order serial correlation  (X 2)  -5.600***
2nd order serial correlation (X 2)  -1.544
Number of observations  2914  2914  2144
Number of countries  92  92  88
Note:  Figures in parentheses are "t" statistics.  Significant coefficients at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
significance levels are indicated by one, two and three asterisks respectively. One-step
version of the GMM estimates are reported, due to small sample considerations (Blundell
and Bond, 1998).  The GMM estimates use the second to ninth lags of the endogenous
variable as instruments.Table  6
Minimum Wages, Adjustment and Growth
Dependent  variable:  annual growth rate of GDP (1970-96)
Minimum  wage indicator= MWI  Minimum  wage indicator  = MW2
Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random
Independent  variables  effects  effects  GMM  effects  effects  GMM
Years long  before the program (Dl)  -0.007  -0.009  -0.012  -0.003  -0.008  -0.011
(-0.575)  (-0.815)  (-0.908)  (-0.232)  (-0.644)  (-0.820)
Years right before the program (D2)  -0.019  -0.014  -0.021  -0.005  -0.004  -0.010
(-1.150)  (-0.902)  (-0.820)  (-0.272)  (-0.240)  (0.430)
Yearsrightaftertheprogramr(D3)  0.055***  0.051***  0.050***  0.041**  0.036**  0.033**
(3.424)  (3.319)  (3.069)  (2.261)  (2.056)  (2.228)
Years long  after the program (D4)  0.033**  0.028**  0.024  0.042***  0.035***  0.030**
(2.599)  (2.339)  (1.613)  (3.037)  (2.654)  (2.237)
Dl  x Minimum  wage indicator  0.018  0.016  0.039*  0.016  0.020  0.012
(0.971)  (0.925)  (1.795)  (0.980)  (1.199)  (0.672)
D2 x Minimum  wage indicator  0.056**  0.048**  0.055  0.035  0.039*  0.032
(2.259)  (2.084)  (1.612)  (1.491)  (1.691)  (1.262)
D3 x Minimum  wage indicator  0.026  0.021  0.023  0.010  0.012  0.007
(1.072)  (0.932)  (1.063)  (0.410)  (0.508)  (0.466)
D4 x Minimum  wage indicator  -0.016  -0.015  -0.009  -0.017  -0.013  -0.017
(-0.863)  (-0.889)  (-0.432)  (-0.916)  (-0.722)  (-0.878)
Minimum  wage indicator  0.002  -0.003  -0.015  -0.011
(0.278)  (-0.376)  (-1.321)  (-1.056)
Industrial  GDP growth  0.742***  0.709***  0.744***  0.754***  0.719***  0.726***
(11.349)  (11.008)  (7.535)  (9.706)  (9.382)  (6.406)
GDP growth  rate in previous year  0.169***  0.210***  0.207***  0.148***  0.187***  0.187***
(8.156)  (10.398)  (3.605)  (6.758)  (8.746)  (3.573)
Industrial  GDP growth x Dl to D4  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Complementary  rigidity indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted  R2 0.298  0.242  0.252  0.194
Sargan  test (p value)  1.000  1.000
Wald,  uncorrelated  effects (p value)  0.460  0.115
1" order serial  correlation  (x2)  -5.015***  -4.888***
2nd order serial  correlation (x2)  -1.436  -1.293
Number of observations  2165  2165  1593  1994  1994  1530
Number of countries  66  66  64  60  60  59
Note:  Figures in parentheses  are "'t" statistics.  Significant  coefficients  at the  10, 5 and  1 percent
significance  levels  are  indicated  by  one,  two  and  three  asterisks  respectively.  One-step
version of the  GMM  estimates  are reported,  due to  small  sample  considerations  (Blundell
and Bond,  1998).  The GMM  estimates  use  the  second  to  tenth  lags  of the endogenous
variable as instruments.Table 7
Mandated Benefits, Adjustment  and Growth
Dependent  variable:  annual growth rate of GDP (1970-96)
Benefits  indicator  = BFI  Benefits indicator  = BF2
Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random
Independent  variables  effects  effects  GMM  effects  effects  GMM
Years long before the program (DI)  -0.013  -0.019*  -0.021  -0.010  -0.016  -0.018
(-1.003)  (-1.776)  (-1.629)  (-0.746)  (-1.585)  (-1.424)
Years right before the program (D2)  0.004  0.001  -0.003  0.019  0.016  0.011
(0.228)  (0.092)  (-0.128)  (1.047)  (1.045)  (0.551)
Years right after the program (D3)  0.050***  0.046***  0.044**  0.035**  0.030**  0.027**
(2.795)  (3.059)  (2.420)  (2.004)  (2.054)  (1.976)
Years long after the program (D4)  0.031  **  0.025**  0.023*  0.034**  0.026**  0.024*
(2.234)  (2.144)  (1.743)  (2.497)  (2.427)  (1.923)
Dl x Benefits indicator  0.019  0.022  0.015  0.010  0.015  0.023
(0.891)  (1.334)  (0.889)  (0.379)  (0.762)  (1.351)
D2 x Benefits indicator  0.003  0.009  0.003  -0.007  -0.002  0.006
(0.120)  (0.378)  (0.122)  (-0.205)  (-0.069)  (0.201)
D3 x Benefits indicator  -0.020  -0.019  -0.020  0.004  0.010  0.017
(-0.723)  (-0.806)  (-0.928)  (-0.124)  (0.380)  (0.963)
D4 x Benefits  indicator  0.014  0.013  0.010  -0.028  -0.024  -0.016
(0.680)  (0.766)  (0.488)  (-1.101)  (-1.177)  (-0.810)
Benefits  indicator  -0.009  -0.008  -0.022*  -0.026**
(-1.013)  (-0.645)  (-1.952)  (-2.015)
Industrial  GDP growth  0.760***  0.670***  0.681***  0.798***  0.690***  0.693***
(10.248)  (10.140)  (6.980)  (11.165)  (11.083)  (7.487)
GDP growth rate in previous  year  0.199***  0.186***  0.186***  0.209***  0.198***  0.199***
(11.208)  (10.332)  (4.334)  (12.079)  (10.889)  (4.837)
Industrial GDP growth x Dl to D4  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Complementary  rigidity indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.201  0.168  0.198  0.173
Sargan test (p value)  1.000  1.000
Wald, uncorrelated  effects (p value)  0.896  0.115
1' order serial correlation  (X2)  -5.405***  -5.786***
2nd  order serial correlation  (x2)  -0.877  -1.119
Number of observations  3072  3072  2097  3166  3166  2144
Number of countries  100  100  83  101  101  83
Note:  Figures in parentheses  are "t"  statistics.  Significant coefficients  at the  10, 5 and  1 percent
significance  levels  are  indicated  by  one,  two  and  three  asterisks  respectively.  One-step
version of the GMM  estimates  are reported,  due to  small  sample  considerations  (Blundell
and  Bond,  1998).  The  GMM  estimates  use the  second  to  tenth  lags  of the  endogenous
variable  as instruments.Table 8
Unionization, Adjustment and Growth
Dependent  variable:  annual growth rate of GDP (1970-96)
Unionization indicator  = TU  1  Unionization indicator  = TU2
Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random
Independent  variables  effects  effects  GMM  effects  effects  GMM
Years long before the program (DI)  -0.010  -0.019*  -0.018  -0.019  -0.024**  -0.012
(-0.756)  (-1.757)  (-1.361)  (-1.431)  (-2.397)  (-0.969)
Years right before the program  (D2)  0.012  0.003  0.002  0.007  0.004  0.016
(0.640)  (0.205)  (0.087)  (0.375)  (0.301)  (0.777)
Years right after the program (D3)  0.035*  0.027*  0.025*  0.048***  0.047***  0.059***
(1.952)  (1.763)  (1.813)  (2.622)  (3.234)  (3.077)
Years long  after the program (D4)  0.029**  0.021*  0.019  0.024*  0.019*  0.032**
(2.135)  (1.896)  (1.535)  (1.675)  (1.741)  (2.157)
Dl x Unionization indicator  -0.017  -0.020  0.014  -0.017*  -0.016**  -0.016*
(-0.609)  (-1.078)  (0.681)  (-1.686)  (-2.124)  (-1.679)
D2 x Unionization  indicator  -0.030  -0.042*  -0.022  -0.023*  -0.023**  -0.023
(-0.896)  (-1.744)  (-0.655)  (-1.680)  (-2.186)  (-1.488)
D3 x Unionization  indicator  -0.047  -0.051  *  -0.049**  -0.008  -0.006  -0.007
(-1.359)  (-1.913)  (-2.318)  (-0.608)  (-0.550)  (-0.588)
D4 x Unionization  indicator  -0.054*  -0.050**  -0.039*  -0.012  -0.010  -0.010
(-1.880)  (-2.282)  (-1.878)  (-1.179)  (-1.272)  (-0.954)
Unionization  indicator  -0.014  -0.017  -0.010**
(-1.442)  (-1.640)  (-2.357)
Industrial GDP growth  0.762***  0.684***  0.682***  0.734***  0.678***  0.695***
(10.648)  (10.690)  (7.463)  (10.123)  (10.738)  (7.847)
GDP growth  rate in previous  year  0.209***  0.178***  0.185***  0.231  ***  0.184***  0.187***
(11.884)  (10.112)  (4.553)  (13.759)  (10.558)  (5.002)
Industrial GDP growth x Dl to D4  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Complementary  rigidity indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.190  0.163  0.205  0.175
Sargan  test (p value)  1.000  1.000
Wald, uncorrelated  effects (p value)  0.249  0.029
15'  order  serial  correlation  (x2)  -5.347***  -5.521***
2nd order serial correlation  (x2)  -1.102  -1.062
Number of observations  3243  3243  2083  3548  3548  2144
Number of countries  103  103  85  118  118  88
Note:  Figures in parentheses  are "t"  statistics.  Significant coefficients  at the  10, 5 and  I percent
significance  levels  are  indicated  by  one,  two  and  three  asterisks  respectively.  One-step
version  of the GMM  estimates  are  reported, due  to small  sample  considerations  (Blundell
and Bond,  1998). The results of the second  regression (TU2)  are estimations  in orthogonal
deviations,  because  the  Wald  test suggests  rejection  of the  hypothesis  that the effects are
uncorrelated  with  the  regressors  in  the  equation  in  levels.  The  GMM  estimates  use  the
second to tenth lags of the endogenous  variable as instruments.Table  9
Govermment Employment, Adjustment and Growth
Dependent  variable:  annual growth rate of GDP (1970-96)
Government  indicator = GT1  Government indicator  = GT2
Fixed  Random  Fixed  Random
Independent  variables  effects  effects  GMM  effects  effects  GMM
Years long before the program (DI)  -0.013  -0.013  -0.015  -0.021*  -0.022**  -0.014
(-1.047)  (-1.206)  (-1.180)  (-1.776)  (-2.079)  (-1.083)
Years right before the program (D2)  -0.005  -0.002  -0.007  0.008  0.010  0.017
(-0.249)  (-0.141)  (-0.286)  (0.458)  (0.653)  (0.807)
Years right after the program (D3)  0.039**  0.039**  0.038**  0.036**  0.038**  0.045**
(2.214)  (2.545)  (2.131)  (2.222)  (2.624)  (2.514)
Years long after the program (D4)  0.025*  0.024**  0.021  0.024*  0.023**  0.031
(1.871)  (2.055)  (1.502)  (1.864)  (2.048)  (2.085)
DI x Government  indicator  0.025  0.027  0.031  0.033**  0.028**  0.014
(1.087)  (1.433)  (1.153)  (2.109)  (2.160)  (0.944)
D2 x Government  indicator  -0.066**  -0.069***  -0.068**  -0.020  -0.026  -0.037*
(-2.282)  (-2.790)  (-2.306)  (-0.988)  (-1.475)  (-1.939)
D3 x Government  indicator  -0.069** -0.069***  -0.073**  -0.016  -0.025  -0.032
(-2.356)  (-2.800)  (-2.059)  (-0.780)  (-1.437)  (-1.021)
D4 x Government  indicator  -0.003  0.003  -0.000  0.014  0.009  -0.004
(-0.123)  (0.133)  (-0.009)  (0.908)  (0.675)  (-0.231)
Government  indicator  -0.003  0.002  0.003
(-0.307)  (0.137)  (0.449)
Industrial  GDP growth  0.646***  0.670***  0.681***  0.596***  0.615***  0.611***
(8.658)  (9.648)  (6.755)  (8.077)  (9.166)  (6.388)
GDP growth rate in previous  year  0.212***  0.194***  0.193***  0.225***  0.210***  0.212***
(11.049)  (10.248)  (4.524)  (11.898)  (11.231)  (5.002)
Industrial GDP growth x Dl to D4  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Complementary  rigidity indicator  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.232  0.177  0.233  0.180
Sargan test (p value)  1.000  1.000
Wald, uncorrelated  effects (p value)  0.741  0.061
15  order serial correlation (x2)  -5.094***  -4.903***
2nd order serial correlation  (X 2)  -0.811  -0.933
Number of observations  2538  2538  1889  2584  2584  1852
Number of countries  83  83  75  83  83  76
Note:  Figures  in parentheses  are "t"  statistics.  Significant  coefficients  at the  10, 5 and  1 percent
significance  levels  are  indicated  by  one,  two  and  three  asterisks  respectively.  One-step
version of the GMM  estimates  are reported,  due  to small  sample considerations  (Blundell
and Bond,  1998). The results of the second regression  (GT2)  are estimations  in orthogonal
deviations,  because  the  Wald test  suggests  rejection  of the  hypothesis  that  the  effects are
uncorrelated  with  the regressors  in the  equation  in levels.  The GMM  estimates  use  the
second to tenth  lags of the endogenous variable as instruments.Figure I
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Note:  Constructed based on regression coefficients reported for the random effects method in Table 5, using the labor
rigidity indicator for the 25'h and 75th  percentiles  for the flexible and the rigid country respectively.Appendix
Selected Country Data
Year of first  Aggregate  Labor market
program  rigidity  rigidity
Country  (until  1996)  indicator  ranking
ALGERIA  1990  0.45  84
ARGENTINA  1987  0.38  62
ARMENIA  1995  N/A  N/A
AUSTRALIA  No program  0.43  78
AUSTRIA  No program  0.45  83
BAHAMAS  No program  0.23  24
BAHRAIN  No program  0.27  36
BANGLADESH  1980  0.33  55
BELARUS  No program  0.64  92
BELGIUM  No program  0.54  88
BENIN  1989  N/A  N/A
BOLIVIA  1980  0.29  45
BOTSWANA  No program  0.21  18
BRAZIL  1986  0.28  42
BULGARIA  1992  0.51  87
BURKINA  FASO  1991  0.40  68
BURUNDI  1986  N/A  N/A
CAMBODIA  1996  N/A  N/A
CAMEROON  1989  N/A  N/A
CANADA  No program  0.26  32
CENTRAL  AFRICA  1987  N/A  N/A
CHAD  1989  N/A  N/A
CHILE  1986  0.15  9
CHINA  No program  0.10  3
COLOMBIA  1985  0.30  47
COMOROS  1991  N/A  N/A
CONGO  1986  N/A  N/A
COSTA RICA  1983  0.41  69
COTE D'IVOIRE  1982  0.27  34
CYPRUS  No program  0.36  60
CZECH REPUBLIC  1991  N/A  N/A
DENMARK  No program  0.51  86
DOMINICAN  REPUBLIC  No program  0.42  75
ECUADOR  1986  0.32  53
EGYPT  1991  0.39  63
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program  rigidity  rigidity
Country  (until 1996)  indicator  ranking
EL SALVADOR  1991  0.17  12
EQUATORIAL  GUINEA  1986  N/A  N/A
ESTONIA  1993  N/A  N/A
ETHIOPIA  1993  0.23  26
FINLAND  No program  0.41  71
FRANCE  No program  0.61  91
GABON  1988  N/A.  N/A.
GAMBIA,  THE  1987  N/A.  N/A.
GERMANY  No program  0.30  50
GHANA  1983  0.23  25
GREECE  No program  0.32  51
GUATEMALA  1993  0.30  48
GUINEA-BISSAU  1988  N/A  N/A
GUYANA  1981  N/A  N/A
HONDURAS  1989  0.32  54
HONG KONG  No program  0.07  1
HUNGARY  1986  0.57  90
INDIA  1993  0.22  22
INDONESIA  1988  0.13  7
IRELAND  No program  0.36  61
ISRAEL  No program  0.39  66
ITALY  No program  0.41  73
JAMAICA  1981  0.28  39
JAPAN  No program  0.26  30
JORDAN  1990  0.11  4
KENYA  1980  0.15  10
KOREA,  REPUBLIC  OF  1984  0.17  13
KUWAIT  No program  0.30  49
KYRGYZ  REPUBLIC  1993  0.57  89
LAO PDR  1989  N/A  N/A
LATVIA  1993  N/A  N/A.
LITHUANIA  1993  N/A  N/A
LUXEMBOURG  No program  0.27  33
MADAGASCAR  1985  0.28  38
MALAWI  1981  N/A  N/A
MALAYSIA  No program  0.18  14
MALI  1988  0.28  41
MAURITANIA  1986  0.27  35
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MAURITIUS  1981  0.34  58
MEXICO  No program  0.33  56
MOLDOVA  1995  N/A  N/A.
MONGOLIA  1994  N/A  N/A
MOROCCO  1984  0.24  28
MOZAMBIQUE  1988  N/A  N/A
NEPAL  1987  N/A  N/A
NETHERLANDS  No program  0.44  80
NEW ZEALAND  No program  0.42  74
NICARAGUA  1992  0.25  29
NIGER  1986  N/A  N/A
NIGERIA  1984  0.21  17
NORWAY  No program  0.41  72
PAKISTAN  1982  0.28  43
PANAMA  1984  0.45  81
PAPUA  NEW GUINEA  1990  N/A  N/A
PARAGUAY  No program  0.41  70
PERU  1992  0.28  44
PHILIPPINES  1981  0.33  57
POLAND  1991  0.45  82
PORTUGAL  No program  0.29  46
ROMANIA  1992  N/A.  N/A.
RUSSIA  1997  0.43  76
RWANDA  1991  N/A  N/A.
SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE  1987  N/A  N/A
SENEGAL  1981  0.32  52
SIERRA LEONE  1984  N/A  N/A
SINGAPORE  No program  0.22  21
SLOVAK  REPUBLIC  1994  N/A  N/A
SLOVENIA  1994  N/A  N/A
SOMALIA  1986  N/A  N/A
SOUTH  AFRICA  No program  0.12  5
SPAIN  No program  0.35  59
SRI LANKA  1990  0.26  31
SUDAN  1980  N/A  N/A
SWEDEN  No program  0.69  93
SWITZERLAND  No program  0.27  37
SYRIAN  ARAB REPUBLIC  No program  0.39  64
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TAIWAN,  CHINA  No program  0.21  20
TANZANIA  No program  0.13  8
THAILAND  1982  0.15  11
TOGO  1983  N/A  N/A.
TRINIDAD  AND TOBAGO  1990  0.39  65
TUNISIA  1987  0.39  67
TURKEY  1981  0.21  16
UGANDA  1982  0.09  2
UKRAINE  1995  N/A  N/A
UNITED  KINGDOM  No program  0.43  77
UNITED  STATES  No program  0.22  23
URUGUAY  1985  0.47  85
VENEZUELA  1989  0.23  27
VIET NAM  1995  0.21  19
YEMEN,  REPUBLIC  OF  No program  0.28  40
YUGOSLAVIA,  FORMER  No program  0.44  79
ZAMBIA  1984  0.19  15
ZIMBABWE  1983  0.12  6
Source:  World  Bank  and  authors'  calculations  using  data  from  Rama  and
Artecona  (2000).  The table  only  reports  countries  that  have  had  a
program  between  1980 and  1996, have  enough  labor  market  data to
estimate  the  labor  rigidity  indicator  or  both.  The  labor  rigidity
indicator  is an  average  over  period  1970-1999.  The  labor  rigidity
ranking  increases with the labor rigidity indicator.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2505 Family  Altruism  and Incentives  Roberta  Gatti  December  2000  R. Bonfield
31248
WPS2506 Ethnicity  and  Wage Determination  Abigail  Barr  December  2000  R. Bonfield
in Ghana  Abena  Oduro  31248
WPS2507  Public  Expenditures  and  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  December  2000  H. Sladovich
Environmental  Protection:  When Is  37698
the Cost  of Funds  Irrelevant?
WPS2508  Sources  of Financial  Assistance  for  Mattias  Lundberg  December  2000  V. Soukhanov
Households  Suffering  an Adult  Mead  Over  35271
Death  in Kagera,  Tanzania  Phare  Mujinja
WPS2509 How  Tax Policy  and Incentives  Jacques  Morisset  December  2000  N. Busjeet
Affect Foreign  Direct  Investment:  Neda  Pirnia  33997
A Review
WPS251  0  Environmental  Protection  and  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  December  2000  H. Sladovich
Optimal  Taxation  37698
WPS2511  Monetary  Policy  under  Flexible  Pierre-Richard  Agenor  December  2000  M. Gosiengfiao
Exchange  Rates:  An Introduction  to  33363
Inflation  Targeting
WPS2512  Quantifying  the Impact  of Technical  Keith  E. Maskus  December  2000  L.Tabada
Barriers  to Trade:  A Framework  for  John  S. Wilson  36896
Analysis  Tsunehiro  Otsuki
WPS2513 Do  State  Holding  Companies  Facilitate  Michel  Kerf  December  2000  M. Leon
Private  Participation  in the Water  Sector?  36151
Evidence  from C6te d'lvoire,  the Gambia,
Guinea,  and  Senegal
WPS2514 Intersectoral  Dynamics  and Economic  Norbert  M. Fiess  January  2001  A. Pillay
Growth  in Ecuador  Dorte  Verner  88046
WPS2515  Firm-Level  Survey  Provides  Data  on  Mary  Hallward-Driemeier January  2001  E. Khine
Asia's  Corporate  Crisis  and Recovery  37471
WPS2516  Does  Decentralization  Increase  Jean-Paul  Faguet  January  2001  H. Sladovich
Responsiveness  to Local Needs?  37698
Evidence  from Bolivia
WPS2517  The Effect  of International  Monetary  William  Easterly  January  2001  K. Labrie
Fund  and  World  Bank  Programs  31001
on PovertyPolicy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2518  Can  Reforming  Global  Institutions  Andres  Solimano  January  2001  R. Bonfield
Help  Developing  Countries  Share  31248
More  in the Benefits  from
Globalization?
WPS2519 Is Investment  in Africa  Too  Low  or  Shantayanan  Devarajan  January  2001  H. Sladovich
Too  High?  Macro  and Micro  Evidence William  R. Easterly  37698
Howard  Pack
WPS2520  Wage Effects  of Unions  and Industrial  Kristin  F. Butcher  January  2001  P. Sader
Councils  in South  Africa  Cecilia  Elena  Rouse  33902